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which seem invariably to accompany such litigation. Among
the factors which would appear to be largely responsible
are: (1) an abundance of evidence that the defendant has
treated the plaintiff with all honesty and fairness, (2) the
often debatable question whether the person promising the
employment for life had the authority to bind the corpora-
tion, (3) evidence of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff of
a reasonable offer of employment. A study of the two re-
cent Maryland cases directly in point reveals the presence
of some one or more of these factors although in TV. B. & A.
Railroad Co. v. Moss,3" a case involving among other things
an indefinite employment contract, none of the above factors
would seem to have been present. In holding the contract
too indefinite for enforcement, the court said: ' "We are
conscious of the feeling that apparently the enforcement of
these rules of law under the facts of this case, does not do
full justice to the parties, yet it is not for courts to make
contracts for parties, but to maintain, unimpaired, the es-
tablished rules of law." But the court added in the follow-
ing paragraph that the plaintiff had another remedy.
The most distressing thing about the principal case is
that the plaintiff allowed himself to be lulled into a false
sense of security and allowed limitations to run on his claim
against the defendant for the original injury. Perhaps the
best solution of this unfortunate type of problem lies in
statutory reform of the statute of limitations to provide
that when a plaintiff forbears to sue because of an unexe-
cuted inducement that limitations shall commence to run
only from the time when the consideration for this forbear-
ance fails.
PROPER VENUE OF SUIT FOR ALIMONY WITHOUT
DIVORCE-OUSTER OF JURISDICTION-AMEND-
MENT-WOODCOCK V. WOODCOCK'
Plaintiff-appellee-wife resided in Baltimore City. De-
fendant-appellant-husband resided in Wicomico County.
The wife filed a suit against the husband in Baltimore City,
Supra, note 14.
a'127 Md. 21.
169 Md. 40, 179 AtI. 826 (1935).
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alleging abandonment and desertion, and asking for ali-
mony without divorce. Later the husband filed a suit
against the wife in Wicomico County, alleging abandonment
and desertion, and asking for a divorce a ,mcnsa et thoro.
Shortly after this he appeared specially in the wife's suit in
Baltimore City and filed a plea denying jurisdiction. Upon
this plea the trial court found that the suit for alimony with-
out divorce was improvidently brought in Baltimore City
but permitted the plaintiff-wife to amend her bill of com-
plaint to one for divorce a mensa et thoro. Upon such an
amendment being made the trial court found that jurisdic-
tion existed and thereupon overruled the plea to the juris-
diction and the motion to quash the service. The husband
appealed. Held: Order reversed and bill of complaint
dismissed. Whereas a suit for divorce may be brought
either in the county where the husband or the wife resides,
a suit for alimony alone may be brought only in the county
where the defendant-husband resides under the usual rules
and subject to the usual exceptions for suits generally.
The husband's filing of the divorce suit in the county where
he resided ousted the jurisdiction of the county where the
wife resided. An alimony case may not be amended into
one for divorce.
This case shows how a wife may be deprived of the
tactical advantage of litigating her right to alimony in her
own county by choosing one, instead of the other of two
types of proceeding which, on the facts of her case, might be
brought with equal ease and which would accomplish the
same result. For, from a realistic standpoint, there is no
essential difference between the granting of alimony with-
out divorce and the granting of a divorce a mensa. They
are similar in the five main essentials. The spouses are not
free to marry others. Their respective rights in each other's
property are not affected. Support is awarded the wife if
she is entitled to it. The living apart of the spouses is
legalized, viz., it is judicially established that the defendant
has committed marital misconduct justifying the plaintiff in
living separate from him. Further, the decree may be
modified or set aside if subsequently occurring circum-
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stances call for such action. Thus it is that, given proper
territorial jurisdiction, it is immaterial to a wife who wishes
to obtain support and legalize her living apart from her
husband (without permitting him to remarry or losing her
rights in his property) whether she sues for partial divorce
or alimony alone without divorce.
However, it is only when the husband has committed
cruelty, vicious conduct, or desertion and abandonment, that
she may make this choice. If the misconduct on the part of
the husband consists of adultery or impotency she must then
choose between suing for alimony alone or for an absolute
divorce, which latter will permit his re-marriage and de-
prive her of her dower rights. (The other two grounds
set up by the Code2 are out of the picture, inasmuch as pre-
marital unchastity is a ground only in favor of the husband
and the voidness ab initio of the marriage would probably
preclude alimony anyhow). For the Stewart case3 decided
that a divorce a mensa could not be obtained on grounds spe-
cified to be grounds only for divorce a vinculo. Thus the
wife whose husband has committed adultery (typically)
must sue for alimony alone if she wishes to "tie him up".
Substantially, it is the same as divorce a mensa, and the
Stewart case indicated as much. The wife may sue for ali-
mony alone on grounds which are grounds for either type of
divorce.'
Thus it is that when the spouses reside in different coun-
ties in Maryland, the venue of the wife's action is deter-
mined by the type of proceeding that she chooses to bring.
If she chooses to sue for whichever type of divorce she is
entitled to she may elect to sue either in her county or in his5
and may choose whichever one is tactically the more ad-
vantageous. If she prefers to bring the suit for alimony
alone, as she must if the ground is adultery and she wishes
to "tie up" her husband, then the rule of the Woodcock case
forces her to bring the suit where her husband resides,
'Md. Code, Art. 16, Sees. 38, 39.
Stewart v. Stewart, 105 Md. 297, 66 At. 16 (1907).
'The two most recent cases to this effect are Staub v. Staub, - Md.
193 At. 605, 608 (1936) and Cohen v. Cohen, - Md. -, 187 At. 104, 107
(1936).
5 Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 87.
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tactically disadvantageous though it may be. In the Wood-
cock case the wife could have brought the exactly similar
action for divorce a mensa in her own county, and could have
after the dismissal of her improvident bill for alimony alone,
save that the husband's previous filing of his suit for divorce
a mensa in his county precluded her and forced her to liti-
gate there.
The Court put the rule of venue of alimony suits on the
statute6 which provides generally that a defendant shall not
be sued out of his own county until after a summons therein
shall have been returned non est, or he shall have absconded
from justice and be found elsewhere, or where he resides in
one county and has business or employment in another.
While the Code article in question deals with process at law
yet the specific mention of equity actions in the part of the
section cited dealing with residence in one county and busi-
ness or employment in another would seem to justify the
application of it to equitable proceedings such as the ali-
mony suit is. The Court pointed out that the concurrent
jurisdiction in divorce cases for the court of either the plain-
tiff's or the defendant's county was of specific statutory
origin and did not apply by analogy to alimony cases, the
procedure in which antedates divorce and is of separate
origin. Thus the venue question in suits for alimony is de-
termined by the general equity procedure while in suits for
divorce special provision is set up enabling the suit to be
brought, on behalf of either spouse, in the county where
either resides. An analogous proviso is found in the adop-
tion statute,7 which permits the filing of a petition for adop-
tion either where the petitioner or the infant resides.
The next point in the case is the ouster of jurisdiction
by the prior bringing of a similar action in a concurrent
jurisdiction. The Court held that the filing of the husband's
suit for divorce in Wicomico County ousted the only juris-
diction that existed in Baltimore City, that for a suit for
divorce and that the wife could not be permitted, by amend-
ment to the improvident alimony suit, to date back her suit
6 Md. Code, Art. 75, See. 157.
Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 74.
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for divorce so that it would be brought before instead of
after the husband's. Had the amendment been held proper,
the wife's divorce suit in Baltimore City would by relation
back, antedate the husband's in Wicomico and thus would
have ousted the jurisdiction of that latter county. The
decision in the case was pointed out to be an application of
the usual rule that where two courts have concurrent juris-
diction over the same subject matter, that court first obtain-
ing jurisdiction keeps it and the other court is not entitled
to interfere.
Analogous provisions for ouster of jurisdiction when
one of two or more concurrent jurisdictions entertains a
case are to be found in other branches of the law. Thus in
the statute8 governing crimes on the Chesapeake Bay, out-
side the body of any county, it is provided that the offender
may be tried in any county in which he is arrested or is first
brought. So it is that with reference to crimes committed
near to the county lines, that that one of the counties in
question which first assumes jurisdiction by issuing process
for the offender shall try the case.'
The inference from the Woodcock case is that the hus-
band's filing a partial divorce suit in his county ousted the
jurisdiction of the wife's county to entertain a similar suit.
The further question arises whether one spouse's filing a
suit for one type of divorce will oust the jurisdiction of the
other county to entertain a suit for the other type of divorce,
assuming that the grounds in the later suit allegedly precede
the time of the filing of the former one. Distinguish Wil-
liams v. Williams,10 which decided that the granting of a
partial divorce in one county would not preclude the def end-
ant therein from divorcing the plaintiff in the other county
for subsequently committed misconduct (adultery). For
that matter, will the wife's filing of an alimony suit in the
husband's county preclude him from suing for either type
of divorce in her county? Or will his suit for divorce in her
county oust the jurisdiction of his county to entertain her
alimony suit?
8 Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 543.9 Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 545.
10 156 Md. 10, 142 Atl. 510 (1928).
CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
It is submitted that upon principle the Woodcock case
should provide the answer to all these questions. Thus it
would be that the first proper filing of any one of the three
possible types of suit, absolute divorce, partial divorce, or
alimony alone, should oust the jurisdiction of the other
county to entertain any of them there. All three types of
action are predicated on an allegation of misconduct on the
part of the defendant and of abstention from such miscon-
duct by the plaintiff.
If competing actions for the separate types of divorce,
or for one of these and for alimony are actually brought in
the same county, the trial court, no doubt, would compel the
cases to be merged. But this cannot be done when the com-
peting actions are brought in different counties and it would
seem that the rule of ouster of jurisdiction is then the only
solution.
The final point in the case concerned the power to amend
the bill for alimony alone to one for divorce a mensa. The
Court held that a bill for alimony alone could not be
amended to one for divorce. As it was too late-jurisdic-
tion being ousted-to bring a new suit for partial divorce,
the wife was unable to litigate in Baltimore City. In an-
other case, the wish to amend rather than to dismiss and
start anew might be induced by a desire for starting the
alimony earlier or because personal service had been orig-
inally obtained but would be unlikely in a new suit. While
the Court referred to the intervening ouster of jurisdiction
in ruling that no amendment could be made yet it may be
taken that they would rule similarly whatever the point that
made an amendment tactically essential to the plaintiff's
case. The Court quoted Miller's Equity Procedure to the
effect that an amendment cannot be allowed to make a new
bill." The Court cited and distinguished the Wald case 2
but did not refer to the Stewart case.13
The Stewart case was the one where the wife sought a
partial divorce for adultery. This the Court refused on the
U See. 186.
Wald v. Wald, 161 Md. 493, 159 Atl. 97 (1932)13 Stewart v. Stewart, supra note 3.
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ground that a partial divorce could be sought only for the
enumerated grounds, which did not include adultery, the lat-
ter being a ground for an absolute divorce only. The Court
remanded the case, however, with leave to the plaintiff to
amend her bill to one for alimony alone without divorce, to
which she was entitled on the ground of adultery.
In the Wald case a similar statement was made by way
of dictum which the court stated in the course of modifying
its action granting the wife an absolute divorce when she
had asked only for 'alimony without divorce. The Court
said, in the opinion on motion to modify: "Since an early
date, the wife, although entitled to a divorce, may, in this
jurisdiction, elect to proceed against the husband for ali-
mony only, and thus she has the choice between a suit for
divorce with alimony or for alimony without divorce. She
may make this choice either when she begins her suit, or dur-
ing the course of the litigation, or, under proper circum-
stances, after an adjudication and remand on appeal."' 4
Thus the Stewart and Wald cases seem to hold that a bill
for divorce may be amended to a bill for alimony alone,
either by the "amendment" permitted by the Stewart case
or by the "choice" permitted by the Wald case. Is the
Woodcock case consistent with these in denying the wife
permission to amend a bill for alimony into one for divorce?
The answer would seem to be that it is. The Stewart and
Wald cases permit the plaintiff to amend by taking out some-
thing which was once in the bill. That which is left was in the
bill when it was originally filed. The Woodcock case forbids
the adding of something which was not in the bill when it
was filed, viz., a prayer for a divorce. Furthermore the
prayer added is granted, if at all, under an entirely different
principle of law. Alimony alone without divorce is granted
under a principle going back to 1689. Divorce with or with-
out alimony has a different statutory origin and goes back
only to the statute of 1841. Alimony is granted under either
of these routes, divorce under one. It would seem con-
sistent to permit the subtraction of something by amend-
ment but not to permit the addition of something dependent
"' 161 Md. 498, 502-3.
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on an entirely different jural explanation. Of course, the
argument against the Woodcock case is that it is equally a
departure to permit a bill for divorce to be amended to one
for alimony alone because it represents a shift to a type of
proceeding of entirely different origin, and that it would be
no worse to permit alimony alone to become divorce than
to permit divorce to become alimony alone, as is permitted-
by the Stewart and Wald cases.
In view of the fact that the original bill in the wife's suit
in the Woodcock case contained the standard prayer for
"general relief" the case must be taken as deciding that the
prayer for general relief in an alimony case does not include
a prayer for whatever type of divorce the plaintiff's allega-
tions would entitle her to. For if it did, amendment would
be unnecessary and the case would be from the start a di-
vorce suit and hence properly brought at the wife's resi-
dence. On the other hand, a statement in the Wald case
intimates that if the wife files a cross-bill to the husband's
suit for divorce, and asks only for alimony and general
relief, she may be awarded a divorce under this cross-bill:
".. . if either matrimonial offense were established, a de-
cree of absolute divorce with alimony, was within the prayer
for general relief."" Thus it would seem to be that an orig-
inal bill for alimony and general relief does not include an
implicit prayer for divorce, but a cross-bill to that effect
does. But this distinction seems reasonable. In the first
place, when the wife's prayer for alimony is by way of cross-
bill, the question of the desirability of divorcing the parties
has been laid before the court by the husband's original bill,
while it has not so been presented when the wife seeks ali-
mony alone by an original bill.
Then, too, in the cross-bill situation, the permission to
the wife to extend her bill for alimony and general relief to
one for divorce without even taking the trouble to amend is
plausible, for the reason that the tactical points that make
it desirable for a husband to oppose amendment are, by the
nature of the situation, missing. Both the husband and the
wife are satisfied with the venue, the husband by having
161 Md. 493, 502.
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brought the suit there and the wife by choosing there to file
a cross-bill. There is no question of obtaining service upon
the husband as he has run the risk of any cross-bill by bring-
ing the case in the first place. The alimony has alreadi
started and its initial date will be the same in either event.
So it is that to permit a substantial "amendment" of a
cross-bill through the guise of the prayer for general relief
is not inconsistent with refusing an amendment of an orig-
inal bill to the same end.
And yet the Court's implicit refusal in the Woodcock
case to allow the prayer for general relief to cover a request
for divorce might seem inconsistent with the attitude ex-
pressed in Hill v. Pinder,6 to the effect that the prayer for
general relief will permit the Court to adapt the relief to the
nature of the case and to give any relief consistent with and
warranted by the allegations of the bill. Divorce is granted
for exactly the same allegations as alimony alone.
The Woodcock, Stewart and Wald cases were concerned
with the power to amend an alimony suit to a divorce one
and vice versa. An analogous problem remains--to what
extent may an a mensa divorce case be amended to an a
vinculo one and vice versa?
There seems to be no Maryland case squarely deciding
anything about whether a partial divorce suit may be
amended to an absolute one. Yet decisions on analogous
points seem to suggest that the rule is against allowing the
amendment.
The Stewart case emphasized the essential difference in
the two types of divorce. This would seem to indicate that
no amendment could be permitted, as an amendment will not
be permitted to make a new cause of action. 7
Then, the implications of the two Schwab cases would
point the same way. The first such case'" held that an orig-
inal bill for partial divorce for cruelty, vicious conduct and
abandonment could not be extended by supplemental bill to
one for absolute divorce for adultery committed after the
18 150 Md. 397, 133 At. 134 (1926). This was not a divorce ease.
"' Miller, op. cit. supra note 11.
" Schwab v. Schwab, 93 Md. 382, 49 At. 331 (1901).
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filing of the original bill. The second Schwab case 9 held
that an original bill for absolute divorce for adultery could
not be supplemented by allegations of further adultery after
the filing of the bill. By analogy it would seem that neither
could amended bills be filed for the same purposes. It would
seem that analogies hold between amendments for further
facts occurring before the filing of the bill and supplemental
bills for those facts occurring thereafter.
The Woodcock case itself would seem to apply by anal-
ogy to prove that a partial divorce suit may not be amended
into an absolute one. If an alimony suit may not be amended
to a divorce suit, why should that which is substantially
equivalent to an alimony suit-a partial divorce suit-any
more be permitted to be amended into a higher type of di-
vorce suit?
And yet the Woodcock case might be explained away on
its facts on the ground that there was no properly brought
suit before the court to be amended. The Court might
permit a suit once brought in the proper jurisdiction, i. e.,
an alimony suit in the husband's county, or a partial divorce
suit in either county, to be amended to a divorce, or an abso-
lute divorce case, respectively, on the theory that there was
jurisdiction from the beginning.
On the other hand, the matter of amending an absolute
suit to a partial one is somewhat of a different problem. If
the plaintiff is the wife, she may accomplish the substantial
effect of amending to a partial divorce by amending her
original suit for absolute divorce to one for alimony alone
under the Stewart case, or by choosing to take alimony
under the Wald case.
Then, regardless of which spouse is plaintiff, an implied
amendment from absolute divorce to partial divorce is per-
mitted by the statute," which provides that where an abso-
lute divorce is asked and the proof shows grounds for par-
tial divorce the court may grant the latter. In substance
this makes any prayer for absolute divorce automatically
include a prayer for partial divorce so that not even the
"Schwab v. Schwab, 96 Md. 592, 54 At. 653 (19W).
',Md. Code, Art. 16, Sec. 39.
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formality of an amendment is needed, if the proof subse-
quently shows that a prayer for partial divorce should have
been made instead of or in addition to one for absolute
divorce.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MUNICIPAL B A N K -
RUPTCY ACT-ENCROACHMENT UPON STATE
POWERS--ASHTON V. CAMERON COUNTY
WATER IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 11
A Texas water improvement district filed a petition in
a Federal District Court for a readjustment of its debts
under the Municipal Bankruptcy Act of May 24, 1934,2 al-
leging insolvency and inability to meet its obligations as
they matured. The petition alleged that more than 30 per
cent of the bondholders had accepted the plan of adjustment
submitted for confirmation and that ultimately more than
two-thirds would do so. Owners of more than 5 per cent of
outstanding bonds intervened and moved to dismiss the
petition. Held (four justices dissenting), the Municipal
Bankruptcy Act was an unconstitutional encroachment upon
State governmental powers; the fiscal affairs of a State
political sub-division cannot be subjected to the control of
the Federal government, irrespective of consent having been
given thereto by the State.
The case presents an interesting development in the in-
terrelationship of the State and Federal governments under
our constitutional system,-particularly in view of the
unanimous decision in Baltimore National Bank v. State
Tax Commission, with which it is difficult to reconcile the
reasoning of the majority of the Court, and which is men-
tioned in the dissenting opinion only.
The Act, in authorizing State political sub-divisions to
petition for a readjustment of their obligations, specifically
provided in section 80(c)' that the Court should not, by any
order or decree, interfere with any of the political or gov-
- U. S. -, 80 L. Ed. 910, 56 S. Ct. 892 (1936) ; rehearing denied, October
12, 1936, 4 U. S. L. Wk. 146, 57 S. Ct. 15 (Mem.).
2 11 U. S. C. A., sec. 301-303.
- U. S. -, 80 L. Ed. 388, 56 S. Ct. 417 (1936).
'11 U. S. C. A., sec. 303 (c).
